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CHARLES L. ARNOLD, NORRIS K.
ARNOLD and JOHN R. ARNOLD
djb/a Arnold Hog Ranch,

Case No.
11,300

Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from judgment of Sixth Judicial District
Court for Sevier County
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MONROE CITY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS.

CHARLES L. ARNOLD, NORRIS K.
ARNOLD and JOHN R. ARNOLD
d 1b I a Arnold Hog Ranch,

Case No.
11,300

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suit by third-class city to restrain and abate operation
of commercial piggery on outskirts of town as a public
nuisance.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court found operation of piggery to be a public
nuisance and ordered operation abated and restrained
further operation by Defendant of a commercial piggery
in the City of Monroe.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant - Appellant seeks an order vacating the
judgment and order of the District Court and dismissing
this action, or for a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action is filed by the Plaintiff in its capacity as a
third-class municipal corporation of 850 people (R. 163)
alleging that it has a right and duty to take such action
for the benefit of its inhabitants. (R. 1)
The pleadings named Charles L. Arnold, an individual,
as the sole defendant. (R. 1) The answer filed by Charles
L. Arnold denied that he had done the acts charged in
the complaint (R. 5, fourth defense). The Defendant
Charles L. Arnold was merely an employee of a partnership operated by his sons, Norris K. Arnold and John R.
Arnold, known as Arnold Hog Ranch (R. 8, 10, 13, 17, 19,
21,53,54,55,56, 136).
Over the objections of the Defendant, Charles L.
Arnold and during the course of the trial the Court
ordered Norris K. Arnold and John R. Arnold added as
defendants in their partnership capacity as Arnold Hog
Ranch without service of summons, amendment of
pleadings, etc. (R. 56, 57). The Court relied on Rule 21,
URCP and the fact that said persons had received notice
of the proceedings and had employed counsel to defend
Charles L. Arnold. (R. 63, 175, 176).
The Court refused to receive evidence concerning siinilar agricultural use being made generally by many other
residents in Monroe City (R. 134, 135, 151, 152, 197),
claiming that existance of one nuisance does not create
a license to establish another nuisace. (R. 134, 135, 151,
152, 197), and rejected argument that reasonableness of
use should be measured by the use to which other persons
similarly situated put their land (R. 138, 151, 152).
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Defendant produced an aerial photograph of the City
of Monroe (Exhibit "E") with colored slides (Ex. "F")
keyed to the photograph which depicted 19 commercial
livestock operations in Monroe and the probable source
of much of the odor complained of by witnesses, which
offer of proof was rejected by the Court (R. 151, 152,
197).
The hog ranch in question is situated one half block
on the South of the last street on the South edge of Monroe City. (Item #20 on the overlay attached to the aerial
photograph marked exhibit "E") There are a few houses
scattered along the North side of that street, but no
houses South of the hog ranch. It is suggested that the
aerial photograph, overlay and slides be used to explain
the physical setting.
The hog ranch is modern, with cement floors in most
areas, sanitary farrowing sheds and facilities, automatic
watering and feeding equipment, chemical controls are
used to control flies and rodents, the pens are cleaned
daily and only hay and dry commercial feed consisting
primarily of grain, minerals, vitamins, antibiotics and
supplements are fed. No garbage or waste is fed. The
pens and sheds are kept clean and dry. The pigs are not
permitted to accumulate or to wallow in mud or muck.
(R. 49, 58-63, 139-143, 166).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MONROE CITY HAS NO POWER TO SUE TO ABATE
OR ENJOIN A NUISANCE
Several reasons exist why Monroe City cannot proseeute this action in the manner attempted in this lawsuit,
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which disabilities render the judgment entered herein
void. Some of those reasons are as follows:
(a) Monroe City is not the real party in interest:

Rule 17 (a) , URCP, reads in part as follows:

"Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest; ... when a statute so provides,
an action for the use or benefit of another shall be
brought in the name o fthe State of Utah." (Emphasis added)
Monroe City claims to have the right and duty to bring
this action for the use and benefit of its citizens (R. 1,
Par. 1), however this action is not brought in the name
of the State of Utah as required by Rule 17 (a). Defendant is entitled to have a cause of action prosecuted by the
real party in interest so that the judgment will preclude
any action on the same demand by another, and so that
the defendant will be permitted to assert all defenses
available against the real owner of the cause. Shaw v.
Jeppson, 121 U. 155, 239 P.2d 745.
This action is to abate and to enJom an alleged nuisance. The right. to maintain an action for nuisance is
defined in 78-38-1, UCA, 1953, which reads as follows:
"Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent,
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance
and the subject of an action. Such action may be
brought by any person whose property is injuriously
affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance may be
enjoined or abated, and damages may also be recovered." (Emphasis added)

5

The lawsuit is entirely for the benefit of the inhabitants
of Monroe City (R. 1, Par. 1) and not for the benefit of
Monroe City Corporation whose property is not claimed
to have been "injuriously affected". The real party in
interest and the only party who can bring this action is
a property owner in Monroe City whose property is allegedly "injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by ... " the alleged nuisance, or by the
city health department in the name of the State of Utah
if the alleged nuisance is dangerous to health or life as
provided in 26-5-5, UCA, 1953.
(b) Powers granted to Monroe City can only be exer-

cised by adopting and enforcing ordinances.

Monroe City as a Municipal Corporation possesses only
those powers conferred upon it by express legislative
enactment. Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 U. 485, 116 P.2d
406; Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 U. 2d 28, 317 P.2d
597. Those powers can only be exercised by the enactment and enforcement of municipal ordinances as provided by 10-5-6, and 10-7-2, UCA, 1953, which read in
part as follows:
"10-5-6. The ... city council in cities of the third
class ... are and shall be the legislative and governing bodies of such cities and towns, and as such shall
have, exercise and discharge all of the rights, powers
and privileges and authority conferred by law upon
their respective cities, towns or bodies, . .. " (Emphasis added)
and
"10-7-2. When by this title power is conferred upon
the ... city council ... to do and perform any act
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or thing and the manner of exercising the same is
not specifically poiinted out, the ... city council ...
may provide by ordinance the manner and details
necessary for the full exercise of such powers."
(Emphasis added)
Plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof by failing
to prove that it had exercised the powers which it claims
were conferred upon it by 10-8-60 and 10-8-67 and which
Plaintiff claims authorizes it to prosecute this action.
Those statutes which confer powers upon cities read in
part as follows:
"10-8-60. They may declare what shall be a nuisance,
and abate the same, and impose fines upon persons
who create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.''
(Emphasis added)
"10-8-67. They may prohibit any offensive, unwholesome business or establishment in and within one
mile of the limits of the corporation, compel the
owner of any pigsty, privy, barn, corral, sewer or
other place to cleanse, abate or remove the same, and
may regulate the location thereof." (Emphasis
added)
The statutes quoted above require that as a condition
precedent to Monroe City exercising the powers therein
mentioned the city council must adopt ordinances which
"declare" Defendant's hog farm to be a nuisance. The
court cannot take judicial notice of city ordinances. State
v. Butcher, 74 U. 275, 279 P. 497. Enactment of an ordinance to take advantage of the delegated powers is a
condition precedent to exercise of those powers. If no
ordinance has been adopted or other appropriate action
taken by the city council to implement the power conferred by statute, Monroe City has no more power than
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if those statutes had never been enacted. The right to
exercise those powers cannot be delegated to the City
Attorney. Art. VI, Sec. 29, Utah Constitution.
The powers conferred upon Monroe City by 10-5-6 and
10-7-2 UCA, 1953, quoted on page 5 are expressly
limited by 10-8-84, UCA, 1953, to the enactment and enforcement by Monroe City of ordinances which carry
those powers into effect, and does not confer upon Monroe City the power to bring this lawsuit as claimed by
Plaintiff. That statute reads in part as follows:
''10-8-84. They (cities) may pass all ordinances and
rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and
suoh as are necessary and proper to provide for the
safety and preserve the health, ... improve ... the
comfort and convenience of the city and of the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein; and may enforce obedience to such ordinance with such fines or penalties as they may deem
proper; . . . " (Emphasis added)
The above statute authorizes Monroe City to adopt "ordinances," "rules," and "regulations" "necessary" to
"carry into effect" "all powers" conferred by Chapter 8
of Title 10, UCA, 1953. Both 10-8-60 and 10-8-67, UCA,
1053, relied upon by Plaintiff to authorize this lawsuit
are part of Chapter 8 and accordingly can only be exercised by the adoption and enforcement of ordinances,
rules and regulations as provided by 10-8-84, UCA, 1953,
quoted above. A municipal corporation may exercise
only the powers granted, and in the manner prescribed.
Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 U. 485, 116 P.2d 406. Monroe
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City has no power to ignore the legislative mandate and
to elect to select another unauthorized method of enforcement of its power by bringing this action. 37 Am
Jur. Mun. Corp. 731, Sec. 117.
( c) Monroe City must bring action in manner pre-

scribed by statute.

The legislature has delegated certain police powers of
the state to municipal corporations, however crime prevention, protections of health, etc. are functions of the
state rather than of any subdivision thereof, and the
officers appointed are public officers whose duties are
defined by law, and they serve the people of the whole
state rather than the municipality which appoints them.
37 Am. Jur. 745, Sec. 131;
The legislature has by 10-7-3, UCA, 1953, required all
cities to establish by ordinance a board of health for their
city, which has power granted by 26-5-1, UCA, 1953, to:
" ... supervise all matters pertaining to the sanitary
condition of its ... city, and shall have power and
authority to order nuisances . . . to be abated or
removed."
and is required by 26-5-5, UCA, 1953, to abate nuisances
in the manner prescribed by that statute which reads in
part as follows:
"26-5-5. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE.-Each local
board of health shall cause every nuisance dangerous to health or human life to be abated. When complaint of such nuisance is made it shall forthwith
cause the matter to be investigated and shall determine whether or not the alleged nuisance is detrimental to the public health or the cause of any
disease or mortality.
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Whenever a local board of health shall determine
that a nuisance detrimental to health exists it shall
in writing notify the occupant of the premises where
the same may be found or, if unoccupied, the owner
or agent thereof of such finding and shall order the
abatement or removal of such nuisance within two
days. If such nuisance is not abated or removed pursuant to such order, the board may summarily proceed to abate or remove the same, or it may cause an
action to be brought in the name of the state by the
county attorney for the abatement of such nuisance."
(Emphasis added)
The evidence in this case shows that Monroe failed to
make a determination that Defendant was creating a
health hazard, that it failed to give written notice to the
owner or occupant of the premises, failed to order an
abatement or removal of the alleged nuisance, (R. 57)
all of which are conditions precedent to the right of the
Monroe City Health Department to abate the alleged
nuisance. Such an action also must be brought in the name
of the State of Utah as required by that statute, and must
be prosecuted by the County Attorney, not the City Attorney. Regulation of health is a function of the State,
not of a municipal corporation, and 26-5-5, UCA, 1953,
quoted above, prohibits the City of Monroe from maintaining any such action except through the properly
designated Board of Health officials who are responsible
to the state, not to the Municipal corporation. (See discussion on page 8 of this brief). The findings of the
Court (R. 29, par. 7 & 8) purport to find that the alleged nuisance is detrimental to health, which if true
establishes that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant a
judgment in this matter since the power to sue to abate
nuisances of that type has been reserved to the State of
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Utah and has not been delegated to Monroe City, except
to the extent that the Monroe City Board of Health (who
are officers of the state) can bring an action in the name
of the State of Utah. Where the statute prescribes a mode
by which a particular act is to be done the prescribed
mode must be followed if the act is to be valid. 37 Am
Jur. Mun. Corp. 731, Sec. 117; Tooele City v. Elkington,
116 P. 2d 406, 100 U. 485; Smith v. City of Bozeman, 398
P. 2d 462, 144 Mont. 528; Stevenson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 317 P. 2d 597, 7 U. 2d 28.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING PARTIES
DURING THE TRIAL OVER OBJECTIONS AND
WITHOUT AMENDING PLEADINGS, SERVING SUMMONS, PERMITTING ANSWER, ETC.
While the first witness was testifying it became apparent that Plaintiff had sued an employee of the Arnold
Hog Ranch partnership but had not sued the partnership
or any member thereof. The employee had delivered
summons to a member of the partnership who had employed counsel to defend the employee in this action.
Both partners were present in court as witnesses. The
Court ordered the partnership added as a party and proceeded with the trial without service of summons, permitting them to answer the complaint, to engage in discovery proceedings or to otherwise prepare for trial
defendant, allegedly under provisions of Rule 21, URCP.
and over the objections of the defendant and the persons
who were joined. (R. 8, 10, 13, 17, 19, 21, 53 - 56, 63, 175,
176). The judgment shows however that the employee
was dropped as an individual party defendant, that the
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partnership was added and that the name of the employee
was improperly named as a member of the partnership.
The Court misconceived the intent of Rule 21 by attempting to use it to substitute a new party defendant.
Rule 21 is intended to afford relief to a plaintiff who sues
too many or too few defendants, rather than one who sues
the wrong party, and it contemplates the retention of one
or more parties against whom the action can proceed
and cannot be resorted to as a method of substituting one
party for another. Barron & Holtzoff, Vol. 2, P. 218;
The attention of the Court is invited to the designation
of the Defendant in the findings and judgment (R. 28-31)
and in the record on appeal as "CHARLES L. ARNOLD,
NORRIS K. ARNOLD and JOHN R. ARNOLD d/b/a
Arnold Hog Ranch." Charles L. Arnold has been dropped
from the case as an individual and the judgment is
against he and his sons in their joint capacity as alleged
partners and binds their joint property of said alleged
partnership only. The judgment as entered is not a judgment against Charles L. Arnold individually except so
far as he has a property interest in the Arnold Hog Ranch
Partnership. Rule 17(d), URCP; Hammer v. Ballantyne,
16 U. 436, 52 P. 770, 67 Am. St. Rep. 643; Blyth & Fargo
Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 Pac. 1027; 39 Am Jur
Parties 957-959. Rule 25 concerning substitution of parties
is not applicable to our situation. The Court had no jurisdiction or power to proceed against the new defendant
without the consent of that defendant and a stipulation
by the existing, and without a complaint that requested
relief against the new, defendant. 39 Am. Jur. Parties
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958; Noonan v. Caledonia Gold Mining Co., 121 US 393 ,
39 Led 1061, 7 S Ct 911. Rule 4(c), URCP, provides in
part as follows:
"The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of
filing the complaint or service of summons."
The jurisdiction of the court has not been invoked
against the new defendant since no summons has been
served or complaint filed as required by Rule 4(c),
URCP, which would give the court jurisdiction over that
party. The court has no right to adjudicate property
rights of persons who are not parties to the action and
who are total strangers to the record. Houser v. Smith,
19 U. 150, 56 P. 683. Rule 19 (b), URCP, requires the
service of summons when even a non-indispensable person ought to be joined in an action. Certainly the same
rule should apply where the suit has been filed against
the wrong party or where an indispensable party is to
be joined.
POINT III
ABATEMENT OF HOG RANCH AND INJUNCTION
AGAINST ITS OPERATION IS UNAUTHORIZED, UNECESSARY AND EXCESSIVE IN THIS CASE.
Injunctive relief is proper only to restrain inflicting of
substantial, serious and irreparable damages to the party
seeking injunctive relief and where there is no adequate
remedy at law. Rule 65A(e) (2) and (3), URCP; McGregor v. Silver King Min. Co., 14 U. 47, 45 P. 1091; 29
Am. Jur. Injunctions 216, Sec. 23, et seq.
(a) Monroe City is not authorized to sue for injunction

In a proper case an actionable nuisance may be en
joined in an action filed by a person " ... whose property
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is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is
lessened by nuisance; . . . " 78-38-1, UCA, 1953. The
powers granted to Monroe City by 10-8-60, UCA, 1953,
to "declare what shall be a nuisance and abate the same"
'
and by 10-8-67, UCA, 1953, to " ... compel the owner of
any pigsty ... to cleanse, abate or remove the same ... "
can only be exercised by the enactment and enforcement
of city ordinances as provided by 10-5-6, 10-7-2, 10-8-60
and 10-8-84, UCA, 1953. See discussion on pages 4- 7.
Monroe City simply has no power to maintain an action
for an injunction to enjoin the operation of a hog ranch
except in the name of the State of Utah to abate an condition dangerous to human life. (See discussion on page
No. 8-9)
(b) The court erred in refusing to allow evidence con-

cerning other commercial livestock operations in Monroe
City.

Monroe City is a country town of approximately 850
inhabitants, who are primarily engaged in agricultural
activities, which has at least 20 commercial livestock
operations located within its city limits. The Arnold Hog
Ranch is located South of the populated section of Monroe City and % block South of the last street on the South
edge of town. Defendant offered into evidence an aerial
photograph of Monroe City (Exhibit "E") with an overlay which shows the location of each of the 20 commercial livestock operations, and various colored slide photographs (Exhibit "F") of each of those commercial livestock operations which depict the type of operation, including the muck, mire, manure, debris, area, livestock,
etc. existing in each operation a few days before the trial.
The numbers in the right-bottom corner of the slides are
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referred to in the transcript, however for ease of correlation between the overlay and the slides, numbers on
gummed labels have been added in the left-upper corner
of each slide which correspond with the same number
large for the area depicted on the overlay.
The overlay, slides and testimony pertaining thereto
were offered to illustrate and explain that Monroe City
has a large number of other commercial livestock operations located within the city limits (which extend beyond the area depicted on the aerial photograph), to
show the reasonableness of the use complained of in the
Monroe City locality and the probable other sources of
the alleged unpleasant odors attributed by Plaintiff's
witnesses to the Arnold Hog Ranch. (R. 151, 153, 194196). The court rejected the slides (Exhibit "F") and the
proffered testimony concerning the other commercial
livestock operations in Monroe City on the theory that
the alleged existence of one nuisance does not justify
the establishment or continuance of another nuisance as
stated by this Court in Ludlow v. Colorado Animal ByProducts Co., where injunctive relief was denied. 104 U.
221, 229, 137 P. 2d 347, 352. (R. 151, 197). We agree with
the rule of law stated in the Ludlow case, however that
rule cannot be applied until the court first applies the
nuisance test of the reasonableness of the use complained
of in the particular locality and in the manner and under
the circumstances of the case stated by this court in the
case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 U. 1, 11, 262 P.
269. Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 U. (2d) 396, 298 P. 2d 425;
Coon v. Utah Construction, 228 P. 2d 997.
In the Ludlow case odors from the rendering plant
were obnoxious to such a degree that it was impossible
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to enjoy a meal when the wind was in a certain direction, and owners of nearby properties were awakened at
nights and rendered sleepless by noxious smells, however in balancing the equities the court awarded damages for reduction in value of property and refused an
injunction.
Our case does not involve the obnoxious smell of cooking carcasses of dead animals such as was involved in the
Ludlow case, but simply the usual barnyard smell of
pigs. The overlay (Exhibit "E"), slides and proffered
testimony, all of which were rejected by the court, show
that commercial hog operations are conducted by other
inhabitants of Monroe City at the following numbered
locations on the overlay:
#1-450 So. Main-40 feeder hogs, 2 sows and couple
of large feeder pigs, mucky condition. (R. 154, 155)
#3-40 head hogs-slaughter operation with entrails
of animals lying on premises. Very dirty and mucky.
Likely source of much odor. (R. 194)
#17-usually about 30 hogs (5 on date of trial) adjacent to Arnold Hog Ranch. Very dirty and mucky condition without cement floors or modern facilities.
Probable source of strong odor. (R. 196)
#18-50 hogs. Very mucky condition. (R. 196)
In addition to the commercial hog operations a substantial number of Monroe City inhabitants maintain
hog pens for domestic use, usually in confined quarters
and in a mucky condition. Hogs, which are fed garbage,
and milk cows, sheep and other domestic animals, which
are generally in a mucky condition, all add to the odor.
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It is extremely doubtful whether the smell of Monroe

City would be substantially lessened by discontinuing
the Arnold Hog Farm operation. The reasonableness of
the Arnold operation is to be measured by whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation
impartially and objectively, would consider it to be unreasonable. Hatch v. W. S. Hatch Co., 3 U. (2d) 295, 283
P. 2d 217, 220. The city's power to declare, prevent or
abate a nuisance does not include the power to declare
anything a nuisance which is not one in fact or per se.
Cox v. City of Pocatello, 291 P. 2d 282, 77 Idaho 225.

Our case is ahnost identical to the Dahl v. Utah Oil
Refining Co. case, 71 U. 1, 11, 262 P. 269 mentioned above
where the grounds for complaint were that offensive and
disagreeable fumes or odors eminated from the refinery
which were carried through the air to plaintiff's house,
which at times awakened persons sleeping in the house,
required plaintiff to shut doors and windows, but were
not constant, were not injurious to life or health, and
caused no direct or physical injury to the property. The
court in the Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co. case supra
reversed a judgment for the property owner, held that a
case of actionable nuisance was not made out, and that
the trial court had erred in not directing a verdict for
the defendant and in denying defendant's motion for a
new trial. About the only difference between our case
and the Dahl case is that the odor is caused by pigs in an
agricultural community while the odor in the Dahl case
was caused by refinery fumes in a refining area. If all
of the pigs in Monroe City and/or all of the commercial
livestock operations in Monroe City were to be removed
because a few inhabitants of that agricultural community

,
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object to barnyard and livestock smells the impact upon
the economy of Monroe City would be serious. If Monroe
City is permitted to single out the Arnold operation for
abatement that action would constitute a denial of equal
justice within the prohibition of the 14th amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah. 37 Am. Jur. Mun.
Corp. 782, Sec. 161.
(c) An actionable nuisance must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Wade v. Fuller, 12 U. (2d) 299,
365 P: 2d 802. The findings (R. 28-30) fail to include a
finding that plaintiff has carried its burden of proof by
clear and convincing evidence as required. Accordingly
the judgment herein is based on a mere preponderence of
proof as cannot stand.
(d) The judgment of abatement and injunction is ex-

cessive and should be reversed.

The operation of a hog ranch in or near an agricultural
community is not a nuisance per se. The legislature has
by 26-6-7, UCA, 1953, denied the power to license a hog
operation unless garbage or offal are fed, and has by 266-5, UCA, 1953, made it lawful to maintain a hog ranch
or piggery so long as it is more than 50 feet from an inhabited house. Commercial feeds and haw are fed by
Arnolds and the nearest residence is approximately 400
feet from the nearest pen. (R. 158) If the court in a
proper case were to conclude that the Arnold operation
is in fact a nuisance it should attempt to work out a
method to abate the nuisance without enjoining the
operation.
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Defendant's operation used modem sanitary methods
and equipment, cement floors in most of the pens, slatted
floors for ease of washing and cleaning in areas where
young pigs are born and kept and chemicals to control
and kill flies and rodents. No garbage or offal is fed in
the Arnold operation. Hay and commercially prepared
dry feed is used with automatic feeders which keep the
feed dry and clean. Pens and corrals are cleaned daily.
(R. 46-49, 58-63, 139-143) Under the circumstances the
Arnold operation should not be enjoined as a nuisance
unless all piggeries from their very nature are found to
be nuisances. Kalamazoo Twp. v. Lee, 228 Mich. 117, 199
NW 609, 2 ALR3d 947; Francisco v. Furry, 82 Neb 754,
118 NW 1102, 2 ALR3d 947; Vana v. Grain Belt Supply
Co., 143 Neb 125, 10 NW2d 474, 2 ALR3d 948; see also
cases annotated at 2 ALR3d 947-949.
Defendant indicated that it was about to invest in additional equipment and facilities which would improve
sanitary conditions and reduce odor at the time that this
action was commenced, but refrained from investing additional funds pending the outcome of this lawsuit. (R.
166, 167)
If an actionable nuisance is found to exist at the Arnold

Hog Ranch the court should have limited its order to
"cleanse" the pig operation as provided by 10-8-67, UCA,
1953, (quoted on page 13) by installation of cement
floor on the entire corral, requiring more frequent or
daily removal of accumulated manure, painting of pens,
buildings and other areas to facilitate cleaning, and
should have attempted other means of reducing the odor
problem without ordering a complete abatement of the
operation. The Court can retain jurisdiction to assure
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that the problem is in fact reduced and can take appropriate action if the problem continues. Ludlow v.
Colo. Animal By-Products Co., 104 U. 221, 137 P. 2d 347,
headnote 9.
SUMMARY
Under Utah Law a municipal corporation has the
power to enact ordinances declaring what is a public
nuisance (within limits of definition of a nuisance contained in state statutes), and to cause public nuisances
to be abated and their continuance punished by fines and
penalties. If the nuisance is detrimental the board of
health of a municipal corporation, (who, like municipal
police officers, exercise the police power of the state and
are primarily responsible to the state rather than the
municipality) may in writing order the abatement of the
nuisance. If their order is not complied with they may
summarily abate the nuisance or may bring an action
for abatement and injunction in the name of the State
of Utah, which action must be prosecuted by the county
attorney. Any action to abate or enjoin a nuisance which
is not detrimental to health must be brought by the
owner of the property claimed to be injuriously affected
by the nuisance. Monroe City is not a proper party plaintiff in this action since it is not authorized by any statute
to maintain this action. Defendants are entitled to be
sued by the real party in interest to avoid a multiplicity
of actions.
Monroe City failed to allege or to sustain its burden of
proof that it had adopted municipal ordinances to implement the powers granted to it by the legislature. If no
ordinance has been adopted by Monroe City to implement
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those powers it can no more exercise those powers than
if they had not been delegated by the legislature.
The lawsuit was improperly filed against an employee
of the Arnold Hog Ranch partnership who filed an answer denying the allegations in the complaint. During
the trial it was established that the wrong party had been
sued. Over the objections of the defendant and new party
the court permitted a substitution of parties by dropping
the individual defendant and adding the two partners
who were present in court. No summons was served and
the complaint was not amended. The court awarded
judgment against the partnership abating and enjoining
the Arnold Hog Ranch operations although no pleading
was ever filed which asserted a claim for relief against
that partnership. The court claimed to be entitled to do
so under Rule 21, however that rule gives relief to a
plaintiff who sues too many or too few parties, not one
who sues the wrong party. The judgment against the
Arnold Hog Ranch partnership is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court and is void.
The court refused to admit testimony, colored slide
photographs or other evidence proffered to establish that
some 19 other commercial livestock operations were
being conducted within the corporate limits of Monroe
City, that several commercial pig operations were being
operated under unsanitary conditions in the same area
of the city and that many domestic animals including
pigs were maintained by inhabitants of Monroe City,
claiming that the existence of one nuisance does not
justify the establishment or continuance of another
nuisance. The proffered evidence is material and relevant as to the probable source of much of the odor com-
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plained about, and to determine whether the Arnold Hog
Ranch operation is reasonable under the circumstances
and in that locality, and to thus determine if it is in fact
a nuisance. This error by the court seriously affected defendant's rights and defendant should be granted a new
trial where that evidence is admitted.
The court failed to make a finding that the evidence
established a nuisance by "clear and convincing evidence" as required by law, accordingly the findings are
insufficient to support the judgment and it should be
reversed.
The judgment abating and enjoining the operation of
the Arnold Hog Ranch constitutes a taking of their property for public use without compensation, is excessive
and unnecessary. Defendants are willing to cement the
floors of the few corrals that are not now cemented, to
facilitate cleaning, to invest in equipment for daily removal of accumulated manure from the premises, and to
do other appropriate things to reduce odor and improve
sanitation. The court should make an order designed to
improve the operation and reduce the odor or other offensive conditions: The court can retain jurisdiction and
take appropriate further remedial action if a problem
continues to exist. An injunction should be used only
after other remedies have failed.
Defendant is entitled to equal rights with the other
inhabitants of Monroe City. Appropriate ordinance
should be adopted in the manner provided by law and
should be applied equally toward the Defendant and all
other inhabitants. This lawsuit attempts to single out
this defendant for special treatment and denies it equal
justice guaranteed by the Utah and U. S. Constitutions.
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It is doubtful that abatement of the Arnold Hog Farm
operation would substantially change the odor of Monroe
City. Abatement of all commercial livestock operations
in the city would seriously affect the local economy. Residents of an agricultural community should expect a
reasonable amount of livestock and barnyard odor.
Rights of the parties should be carefully considered and
weighed.
It is respectfully requested that the judgment entered
by the court be reversed and that the case be dismissed
or remanded for a new trial with appropriate parties,
pleadings and evidence.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for DefendantAppellant

